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By Daniel B. Garrie * & Bill Spernow **
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

Today’s judges face numerous challenges in determining the truth of the matter at
hand, but none is more challenging than ruling on issues that pivot on digital evidence. 1
Gone are the days when the most technically challenging decision was determining if
evidence on a floppy disk 2 had been destroyed because a litigant exposed it to a strong
magnetic field. 3 Today’s legal challenges are extremely technical when it comes to
determining the integrity of digital evidence and assigning responsibility for direct or
indirect acts of spoliation. 4 While judges are entirely capable of arriving at the correct
decision when it comes to ruling on the value of digital evidence, 5 they are at the mercy
of the “experts” involved when it comes to issues of spoliation. 6
*

Mr. Daniel Garrie, Esq., B.A. & M.A. Computer Science is a lawyer and technologist, and is
recognized as one of the eminent thought leaders specializing in electronic discovery. Mr. Garrie is a
managing partner at Focused Solution Recourse Delivery Group LLC (FSRDG), a national legal risk
management consulting firm, and serves as an e-Discovery arbitrator and special master all over the United
States. He has also held technology positions in both the private and public sector. He can be reached at
dgarrie@fsrdg.com.
**
Mr. Bill Spernow, MBA, CISSP, CEH, PMP, Net+, Sec+, CHS III, GAPPI/GCP combined a career as
a computer engineer and California Police Officer and quickly obtained a national reputation as one of the
first Cyber Cops. He has held IT Security positions in both the public and private sectors and currently
provides litigation and forensic support services in the Atlanta area.
Special thank you to Mr. Elan Raffel. Mr. Raffel is entering his second year at Cardozo Law School of
Yeshiva University in New York and is interested in practicing corporate law when he graduates.
1
Eckhardt v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 3:06CV512-H, 2008 WL 1995310, at *6 (W.D.N.C. May 6, 2008)
(finding that the defendant did not act in bad faith but commenting on the challenges raised by “the
changing face of discovery in an electronic world”).
2
A floppy disk is a “[s]mall removable disk[], also known as [a] diskette[], that come[s] in two sizes,
3.5” and 5.25”. The amount of data that can be stored on a diskette depends on the size, and can be 360
kilobytes to 1.4 megabytes.” TOM O’CONNOR, LEGAL ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT INSTITUTE, BASIC
PRINCIPLES OF AUTOMATED LITIGATION SUPPORT 51 (2005), available at http://www.legaledocs.org/Basic%20Principles%20of%20Automated%20LitigationSupport%20Primer.pdf.
3
Nathan Wiebe, Regarding Digital Images: Determining Courtroom Admissibility Standards, 28 MAN.
L.J. 61, 63 (2002).
4
Spoliation can be defined as “the destruction or alteration of evidence during on-going litigation or
during an investigation or when either might occur sometime in the future. Failure to preserve data that
may become evidence is also spoliation.” Spoliation—Working EDRM, EDRM: ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
REFERENCE MODEL, http://edrm.net/wiki2/index.php/Spoliation#ref_fenwickglossary (last visited Sept. 6,
2010).
5
“According to Black’s law dictionary, evidence is ‘any species of proof, or probative matter, legally
presented at the trial of an issue, by the act of the parties and through the medium of witnesses, records,
documents, exhibits, concrete objects, etc. for the purpose of inducing belief in the minds of the court or
jury as to their contention.’ Electronic information (like paper) generally is admissible into evidence in a
legal proceeding.” eDiscovery Glossary, RENEWDATA, http://www.renewdata.com/ediscoveryglossary.php#e (last visited Sept. 6, 2010) (defining electronic evidence). Digital evidence can be defined

1

NORT HW EST ERN JO URN AL O F T ECHN OLO GY AND IN T ELL ECT UAL PRO PERT Y

¶2

¶3

¶4

¶5

[2010

In an expanding trend, judges are basing important decisions on inaccurate or
incomplete technical details concerning digital evidence. 7 As a result, for cases where
digital evidence plays a pivotal role, either dangerously erroneous precedent will be
established based upon legally sound but technically flawed logic, or successful appeals
will increase dramatically as the technical weaknesses of the decision are subsequently
exposed. This thesis—that technological ignorance leads to legal error—is the primary
focus behind this article.
We have identified a group of recent cases where digital evidence played a
significant role in the judicial decisions. From this group a single case was selected to
serve as a “test case” for our thesis. The remainder of this article will discuss the
decisions reached in this “test case,” and demonstrate how a limited understanding of
low-level computer functions, 8 especially at the level where files are created and deleted,
contributed to legal decisions by the court that were fundamentally incorrect.
At this point a disclaimer is in order. To present our argument, we need to discuss
technical issues related to computer storage techniques 9 and file structures. 10 Clearly the
restricted length of this article prevents a detailed discussion. Where possible, analogies
will be used to compensate. In other cases we ask that you to take our word that the
opinions presented are expert ones formed after decades of experience with cases
involving digital evidence. Our goal is not to overwhelm you with technical-level geek
talk, rather to help you to come away from the article with a deeper, but common sense
appreciation for the impact a limited understanding of computer technology can have on
even the most basic of judicial decisions.
The case we selected to highlight is TR Investors, LLC v. Genger. 11 In Genger a
determination of spoliation was made by the Delaware Court of Chancery, and Vice
Chancellor Strine sanctioned defendant Arie Genger for his actions. 12 The sanctions were
issued due to the defendant’s involvement in overwriting the content of deleted files in
the “unallocated space” of computers under his control. 13 The first part of the article will

as “[a]ny computer-generated data that is relevant to a case. Included are email, text documents,
spreadsheets, images, database files, deleted email and files and back-ups. The data may be on desktops,
laptops, servers, hard drive, backup tape, CD or DVD.” TransPerfect Legal FAQs, TRANSPERFECT LEGAL
SOLUTIONS, http://www.transperfect.com/TLS/resources/resources_faq.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2010)
(defining Electronic Stored Information (ESI)).
6
Mark D. Robins, Computers And The Discovery of Evidence—A New Dimension To Civil Procedure.
174 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 411, 509–10 (1999).
7
Eric Van Buskirk, Digital Evidence: Challenging the Presumption of Reliability. J. DIGITAL FORENSIC
PRAC., 19, 22–23 (2006).
8
In programming, a computer function can be defined as a self-contained software routine that performs
a task. Functions can do large amounts of processing as well as small tasks.
9
Computer storage refers to the act of placing information on a disk where it available for later use.
O’CONNOR, supra note 2.
10
“The file structure of a program refers to the way information on a disk or tape is organized.
Programs often need to read data from files and write information to files in order to keep permanent
records. How these files are organized and used is an important part of the design of a program.” Randall
Davis, The Nature Of Software And Its Consequences For Establishing And Evaluating, 5 SOFTWARE L.J.
299, 320 (1992).
11
TR Investors, LLC v. Genger, No. 3994-VCS, 2009 WL 4696062 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2009).
12
Id. at *17–19.
13
Id. at *7 n.21 (citing Ohana Aff. at ¶ 13, Genger, 2009 WL 4696062; Genger Aff. at ¶¶ 12–14,
Genger, 2009 WL 4696062; Tr. at 257:4–258:2, Genger, 2009 WL 4696062).
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focus on the decision itself. We will then discuss why, in our considered opinion, the
court’s decision was incorrect.
II. TR INVESTORS, LLC V. GENGER
¶6

¶7

The storage systems of most computers have two primary areas where files 14 reside.
Those two areas are “existing file space” where valid files can be found, and deleted-free
space, 15 or more globally “unallocated space,” 16 which for purposes of analogy can be
considered as a garbage dump where unwanted and discarded information goes to await
recycling. This “garbage dump” space exists on every hard drive 17 and server, 18 and is
what forensic experts typically examine when recovering deleted files that have been
emptied from the recycle bin. 19
In the Genger case, the court determined that a consultant employed by the
defendant had used a wiping utility 20 to overwrite the unallocated space of a desktop
computer with the intention of preventing the plaintiff from recovering deleted files
relevant to the case. The court reached this conclusion after it was informed by the
plaintiff’s computer experts that electronic versions of documents known to be in the
defendant’s possession could not be located as either valid 21 or deleted files on the

14

A “file” can be defined as “[a] collection of data or information that has a name, called the filename.
Almost all information stored in a computer must be in a file. There are many different types of files: data
files, text files, program files, directory files, and so on.” E-Discovery Knowledge Center: Search the
Glossary, FIOS, INC., http://www.fiosinc.com/e-discovery-knowledge-center/electronic-discoveryglossary.aspx?cid=DG (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
15
“Deleted Data” is “[d]ata that once existed on a computer and has subsequently been deleted by the
user. Deleted data actually remains on the computer until it is overwritten by new data or ‘wiped’ with a
specific software program.” LEGAL ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT INSTITUTE, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF
AUTOMATED LITIGATION SUPPORT 74 (2005) available at http://www.legaledocs.org/Basic%20Principles%20of%20Automated%20LitigationSupport%20Primer.pdf.
16
“Unallocated space” is “space on a hard drive that potentially contains intact files, remnants of files,
subdirectories, or temporary files which were created and then deleted by either a computer application, the
operating system or the operator.” eDiscovery Glossary, RENEWDATA,
http://www.renewdata.com/ediscovery-glossary.php#e (last visited Sept. 8, 2010).
17
The “hard drive” is “the primary computer storage medium in desktop and laptop computers.” Hard
Drive—EDRM, EDRM: ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY REFERENCE MODEL,
http://www.edrm.net/wiki/index.php/Hard_drive (last visited Sept. 8, 2010).
18
A “server” is “[a]ny computer on a network that contains data or applications shared by users of the
network on their client PCs.” Glossary of Terms, KROLL ONTRACK 9 (Oct. 1, 2008),
http://www.krollontrack.com/library/glossary_krollontrack2008.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2010).
19
The “recycle bin” on a computer is the location on the hard drive where deleted folders or files are
temporarily stored. The recycle bin keeps the files intact in case the user wants to restore them, but can be
completely erased from the computer by the user.
20
Wipe is the “term for deliberately overwriting a piece of media and removing any tract of files or file
fragments.” Wipe—EDRM, EDRM: ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY REFERENCE MODEL,
http://www.edrm.net/wiki/index.php/Wipe (last visited Sept. 8, 2010).
21
“Active data is information residing on the direct access storage media of computer systems, which is
readily visible to the operating system and/or application software with which it was created and
immediately accessible to users without undeletion, modification or reconstruction (i.e., word processing
and spreadsheet files, programs and files used by the computer’s operating system).” Glossary of Terms,
KROLL ONTRACK 1 (Oct. 1, 2008), http://www.krollontrack.com/library/glossary_krollontrack2008.pdf
(last visited Sept. 24, 2010).
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defendant’s computer systems. 22 The inability to forensically locate these documents in
digital form resulted in sanctions against the defendant Genger. 23
¶8
Our review of the actions taken by all involved, per the court record, establishes
that the court, through no fault of its own, reached the wrong conclusions on several
levels. Had the court been properly informed of the following technical facts, it is highly
likely that it would have reached a more informed decision in favor of the defendant.
Genger involved the battle for control of an investment company known as TRI. 24 The
dispute was between the Trump Group, the new owners, and Arie Genger, the original
owner. 25 As is standard in such cases, the court entered a “status quo order,” enjoining
both parties from “tampering with, destroying, or in any way disposing of any
[c]ompany-related documents, books, or records.” 26
¶9
The problem was that the court acknowledged Mr. Genger as an “international man
of mystery,” 27 who had used TRI’s computer system not just to conduct TRI business, 28
but to create and receive documents implicating Israel’s national security and as a storage
device for his own personal financial and legal documents. 29 To protect the sensitive
documents, TRI retained a law firm that in turn engaged a forensic consulting firm to
untangle this Gordian knot. 30
¶10
Over the course of a weekend, the court permitted the defendant’s attorneys and
consultants to open documents and e-mails on the TRI computers and encrypt those files
containing personal and Israeli government information. 31 The consulting firm created
file level snapshots of the “existing files” on the potentially responsive hard drives. 32
However, as is common in e-discovery cases, the consultants never created a forensic
image 33 of the entire hard drive, which would have included all of the unallocated space
allowing it to be preserved for additional forensic analysis. After the consultants took a
“snapshot” of the existing valid files, the computers and hard drives were reviewed by the
law firm in accordance to the process agreed to by the parties. 34 Where Genger’s
personal items were discovered on these systems, the court permitted these items to be
individually encrypted. 35 Once an encrypted version of the file was created the original
was deleted using the standard delete function of the Windows operating system. The
court acknowledged that during this encryption process, non-encrypted, temporary copies

22

TR Investors, LLC v. Genger, No. 3994-VCS, 2009 WL 4696062, at *6–7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2009).
Id. at *15–20.
24
Id. at *1–15.
25
Id. at *1.
26
Id. at *1 n.1 (citing Status Quo Order, Genger, 2009 WL 4696062).
27
Id. at *5.
28
Id. at *15–20.
29
Id.
30
Id. at *11.
31
Id.
32
Id. at *12.
33
A Forensic Image or Copy is a “precise bit-by-bit copy of a computer system’s hard drive, including
slack and unallocated space.” O’CONNOR, supra note 2.
34
Genger, 2009 WL 4696062, at *5–6.
35
Encryption can be defined as the “[a] procedure that renders the contents of a message or file
scrambled or unintelligible to anyone not authorized to read it.” Glossary of Terms, AMERICAN DOCUMENT
MANAGEMENT, http://www.amdoc.com/section/Glossary/18/interior.php#E (last visited Sept. 8, 2010).
23
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of Genger’s documents were created in the unallocated space of the hard drive. 36 Those
temporary copies, if recovered later from the unallocated space, would have defeated the
point of the encryption process.
¶11
Apparently motivated by this concern, Genger and his technical advisor later ran a
wiping software program on the unallocated space after the file level review had been
completed, destroying (by overwriting) all previous data contained in the unallocated
space, before turning over the computers and hard drives to the Trump Group. 37
¶12
Although Genger did create a file level copy of the computer systems in order to
have a snapshot of every valid file on the system, the court found Genger’s actions of
wiping the unallocated space to be a deliberate attempt at spoliation. 38 As a result, the
court imposed a series of heavy sanctions upon Genger, fining him and shifting the
burden of proof to him. 39 The court’s logic in imposing sanctions was based on a
fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of unallocated computer space and the data
that resides within that space. Moreover, in imposing sanctions upon Genger, Vice
Chancellor Strine has expanded preservation orders in the Delaware courts to include
unallocated space in all computers and servers involved in litigation—an unintended
result that is unworkable, unreasonable, and prohibitively expensive. 40
III. WHY THE COURT’S DECISION TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS WAS WRONG
¶13

The court’s logic in imposing sanctions was faulty on a number of technical levels.
While the defendant wiped the unallocated space of these hard drives, it was only after
first taking and saving externally a file-level snapshot of the “existing files” on the hard
drives in question. 41 After any sensitive documents that contained national security or
personal information were encrypted the protocol required that the original hard drives be
turned over to the plaintiff. It was this “turn-over” protocol requirement that triggered
the wiping of unallocated space. The wiping was necessary to delete unencrypted copies
of the sensitive documents automatically generated as part of the encryption process. 42 It
should be noted that after the encryption process was completed, thousands of sensitive
files (that were not encrypted) which had been deleted now resided in the unallocated
space. The later use of forensic analysis tools by the plaintiff would have allowed for the
recovery of a significant percentage of these sensitive files in their original state. The
court was wrong to find spoliation and impose sanctions for a number of reasons. Our
first example is significant: the court did not properly determine if the wiping software
had destroyed relevant documents. 43 In its opinion, the court references a memorandum,
36
Genger, 2009 WL 4696062, at *5 n.13 (citing Leicht Aff. at ¶¶ 1–4, Genger, 2009 WL 4696062; Tr.
at 251:6–252:11, Genger, 2009 WL 4696062).
37
Id. at *7.
38
Id. at *17
39
Id. at *19.
40
Thomas Y. Allman, Managing Preservation Obligations After the 2006 Federal E-Discovery
Amendments, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9 (2007), available at http://jolt.richmond.edu/v13i3/article9.pdf.
41
Genger, 2009 WL 4696062, at *6.
42
See John B. v. Goetz, 531 F.3d 448, 460–61 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that district court orders calling
for forensic imaging of media primarily for the purpose of preservation was an abuse of discretion, citing
the fact that the record lacked any evidence that defendants have intentionally destroyed relevant ESI and
noting the significant privacy and confidentiality concerns raised by the order).
43
Phillips v. Potter, No. 7-815, 2009 WL 1362049, at *6 (W.D. Pa. May 14, 2009) (finding there was no
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the “Lentz Memo,” as one of the missing documents that could have been recovered from
unallocated space as a deleted file—assuming the unallocated space had not been wiped
by the defendant. 44 The court’s determination, however, was based solely on cause and
effect (it should be here, it’s not, hence it must have been wiped), not independently
verifiable forensic evidence. 45 In addition, other technological reasons related to the
normal day-to-day operation of any Windows-based computer system would also explain
why the missing files could not be found in the unallocated space.
¶14
What the court perhaps did not fully understand is that every action, including just
turning on the computer in the morning, creates, deletes, and modifies hundreds of files
and overwrites data in the unallocated space. 46 Given the nature of the encryption
process expressly permitted by the court, it is more than likely that all, or almost all, of
the data assumed to be available for recovery by the court in the unallocated space had
already been overwritten. 47 This is because, as the court recognized, the encryption
process creates at least one or more temporary files, a final “encrypted” file, and the need
to delete the original file. All of this activity consumes resources in the unallocated space
area of the hard drive. 48 Given the large number of documents reviewed over the course
evidence of destruction of relevant documents and refusing to order sanctions based upon “mere
speculation” that relevant documents were destroyed, also noting that there was no indication of any bad
intent on the part of the defendant); Wong v. Thomas, No. 05-2588 (AET), 2008 WL 4224923, at *4
(D.N.J. Sept. 10, 2008) (denying motion for sanctions due to inability to establish relevance); Pandora
Jewelry, LLC v. Chamilia, LLC, No. CCB-06-3041, 2008 WL 4533902, at *9–10 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2008)
(refusing to impose sanctions based on lack of evidence of data’s relevancy); School-Link Techs., Inc. v.
Applied Res., Inc., No. 05-2088-JWL, 2007 WL 677647, at *3–4 (D. Kan. Feb. 28, 2007) (refusing to order
sanctions despite finding that the defendant breached its duty to preserve evidence as there was no showing
that the breach caused relevant documents and information to be destroyed); Lexis-Nexis v. Beer, 41 F.
Supp. 2d 950, 955 (D. Minn. 1999) (The court was not convinced that defendant could show that evidence
pertinent to the litigation was actually destroyed. Additionally, even if information had been deleted—for
example, when Defendant’s counsel overwrote inactive data while attempting to make a copy of the laptop
hard drive—the court found that Lexis-Nexis had failed to demonstrate that the loss of this evidence would
prejudice its case.); Hildreth Mfg., LLC v. Semco, Inc., 785 N.E.2d 774, 780–81 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003)
(holding that sanctions for deleting e-data were unwarranted when there was no reasonable possibility that
data was relevant).
44
Genger, 2009 WL 4696062, at *11 n.34 (citing Mem. from David Lentz to Arie Genger, William
Dowd, and Christopher Gengaro, Genger, 2009 WL 4696062 [hereinafter Lentz Memo]).
45
See Technical Sales Assocs., Inc. v. Ohio Star Forge Co., Nos. 07-11745, 08-13365, 2009 WL
728520, at *2–3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 19, 2009) (denying the defendant's motion for contempt since the
stipulated order protected the “discovery of actual data, not the absence of data”); see also Se. Mech.
Servs., Inc., v. Brody, No. 8:08-CV-1151-T-30EAJ, 2009 WL 2242395, at *3–4 (M.D. Fla. July 24, 2009)
(denying the defendants’ motion to impose sanctions against the plaintiff despite finding of spoliation
because plaintiff did not act in bad faith and the defendants failed to show that any “crucial evidence”
existed on the destroyed backup tapes).
46
Mintel Int’l Group, Ltd. v. Neergheen, No. 08-cv-3939, 2010 WL 145786, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12,
2010) (The court found that any programs on the laptop that would have destroyed metadata, such as
antivirus software, were not user initiated. The court held that the defendant’s destruction of any evidence
was unintentional, resulting from typical computer use―rather than a pattern that is easily recognized by
forensic experts as spoliation. (Emphasis in original.)); see Christopher D. Wall & Michelle S. Lange,
Electronic Discovery: Recent Developments, WASH. LAWYER (Mar. 2003), available at
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/resources/publications/washington_lawyer/march_2003/electronic.cfm,
(noting that “[s]imply booting a computer can possibly destroy valuable metadata (data about the data, such
as to, from, bcc, and date fields in e-mail and the ‘last accessed’ or ‘last modified’ date in a document) that
could be relevant in a lawsuit”) (citing Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders. Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 652–54
(D. Minn. 2002)).
47
Mintel, 2010 WL 145786, at *8; Wall & Lange, supra note 46.
48
See Allman, supra note 40.
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of days by a team of attorneys, any data in the unallocated space could have easily been
overwritten by the encryption process itself, or the normal day-to-day operation of the
computer. 49 Thus, the Vice Chancellor’s order, by permitting the encryption of files
stored on the systems in question, most likely resulted in overwriting substantial blocks
of data that previously had existed in the unallocated space. If, as the court found, there
was a smaller dedicated unallocated space for electronic mail and email attachments, then
all email derived data in this smaller, segregated segment was almost certainly
overwritten before the wiping software was utilized. 50 If the Lentz Memo, as an example,
had been deleted from the unallocated space, it could have been innocently overwritten
by the thousands of files created during the encryption process specifically allowed by
the court. 51 So even if the defendant did not run the wiping software, the Lentz Memo
may well have never been found due to the impact the normal day-to-day operations of
the computer has on the unallocated space. Its absence does not demonstrate that the
defendant intentionally wiped it. 52
¶15
It is also unclear if the file-level copying process created a copy of the $MFT file
for each computer backed up. This is important because the $MFT file, a Windows
system file that is really a small database, contains technical details about all valid files
and most deleted files. 53 Think of the $MFT file as the table of contents for a hard drive
that points you to the page of interest.54 That this file was not examined to determine
what details existed about previously deleted files was a significant technical oversight
that ignored valuable potential evidence. This is critical because a review of the $MFT
could have likely resolved the courts concern regarding intentional spoliation by
specifically identifying the names and sizes of the files that had been recently deleted. 55
¶16
The court also did not appear to understand that a vast majority of data in
unallocated space are random fragments. 56 The analogy here is expecting entire pristine
documents in an area that consists mostly of confetti. This is probably why TRI’s
computer consultants never preserved the unallocated space before the encryption process
was initiated. The initial judicial preservation order issued by the court prohibited the

49

Genger, 2009 WL 4696062, at *5 n.13 (citing Leicht Aff. at ¶¶ 1–4, Genger, 2009 WL 4696062; Tr.
At 251:6–252:11, Genger, 2009 WL 4696062).
50
Maxpower Corp. v. Abraham, 557 F. Supp. 2d 955, 962 (W.D. Wis. 2008) (denying plaintiff’s motion
for sanctions due to insufficient evidence showing that wiping of hard drive was deliberate spoliation even
though the plaintiffs, computer forensics expert examined the defendants, laptops, finding evidence of hard
drive wiping software and of text strings referring to information about outdated products).
51
Wall & Lange, supra note 46.
52
United States v. Kimoto, 588 F.3d 464, 489–90, 497 (7th Cir. 2009) (Defendant appealed his
conviction, arguing that the government had destroyed or withheld exculpatory evidence and failed to
provide forensic copies of hard drives, which resulted in a Brady violation. In affirming the conviction, the
court determined there was no Brady violation. To support its ruling, the court noted that no destruction or
spoliation on behalf of the government existed, there was a material lack of proof that certain alleged
evidence was missing.); Floeter v. City of Orlando, No. 6:05-cv-400-Orl-22KRS, 2007 WL 486633, at *7
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2007) (denying sanctions for lost hard drives and destroyed backup tapes); MGE UPS
Sys., Inc. v. Fakouri Elec. Eng., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 724, 741–42 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2006).
53
Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World. 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 539–40 (2005).
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
See Robert Douglas Brownstone, Collaborative Navigation of the Stormy e-Discovery Seas, 10 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 53, ¶ 8 n.22 (2004), available at http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v10i5/article53.pdf.
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destruction of any company related documents, books, or records. 57 It is not clear how
Vice Chancellor Strine bridged the technology world from that routine mandate to the
finding that deleted files, that per normal descriptive terms are already destroyed and are
unrecoverable within the Windows Operating System, fall within those parameters. A
routine e-Discovery process paying no attention to deleted files was transformed, to the
defendant’s disadvantage, into an e-Forensic investigation about deleted files.
¶17
It is unreasonable for courts to expect litigants to preserve the unallocated space of
their computers, or understand they are required to preserve unallocated space, as the
result of a routine preservation order.58 To expand preservation orders to include
unallocated space in computers and servers on pain of sanction, as Vice Chancellor Strine
now has done in the Delaware courts, is unworkable and unreasonable. 59 To preserve this
storage space, a company would effectively have to shut down all their computers and
servers prior to imaging—grinding the business to a halt. 60 Even then, it is not always
possible to recover deleted files from unallocated space, as opposed to random bits and
pieces of the whole.
¶18
Moreover, because of the random nature of the unallocated space, it is impossible
to know with certainty where the previously deleted information sought is located. 61 It is
a simple matter to segregate active files by custodian. If employee John Smith has
information regarding the litigation, you segregate his active files and search them for
useful information. With fragments of files, as typically found in unallocated space, no
such segregation is possible. The analogy here is searching for a needle in a field of
haystacks. The cost will always outweigh the benefits, if any, of such a search. 62 For a
company that has a number of servers, even the cost of imaging and maintaining the
unallocated space, as will be required if unallocated space is now part of every “status
quo” preservation order and litigation hold, may be prohibitively expensive. 63
¶19
Finally, the court was correct to note that the timing of the wiping activity by TRI’s
consultant, at night after everyone was done for the day, might provide reason for
suspicion. However, undertaking such a lengthy process at night is a common practice
that minimizes the impact of the e-Discovery process on the business. 64 Accordingly,
such actions on their own should not have led the court to conclude a nefarious intent. 65
57

Status Quo Order, supra note 26.
Corinne L. Giacobbe, Note, Allocating Discovery Costs in the Computer Age: Deciding Who Should
Bear the Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored Data, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257, 262 (2000).
59
Allman, supra note 40.
60
See Brownstone, supra note 57 (discussing the complexities of e-Discovery and the high costs
associated with preserving data, the different methods of production and review, and the difficulties posed
by judicial sanctions).
61
Allman, supra note 40.
62
Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Exec. Office of the President, Nos. 07–1707, 07–
1577 (HHK/JMF), 2008 WL 2932173, at *3 (D.D.C. July 29, 2008) (declining to order imaging of hard
drives due to cost-benefit analysis); Giacobbe, supra note 59 at 262.
63
Giacobbe, supra note 58 at 262.
64
Id.
65
United States v. Bunty, 617 F. Supp. 2d 359, 369–71 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (dismissing a spoliation claim
finding lack of bad faith); Ed Schmidt Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Co., LLC, 575 F.
Supp. 2d 837, 841–42 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (requiring evidence of intent to deprive opposing party of useful
information for spoliation claim); New York State Nat’l Org. for Women v. Cuomo, No. 93 CV
7146(RLC) JCF, 1998 WL 395320, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1998) (declining to award spoliation sanctions
where no showing of intentional failure to preserve electronically stored information).
58
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Indeed, if the defendant’s consultant was really trying to hide his actions from discovery,
he could easily have removed all forensic trace evidence of his wiping activities. 66 The
failure to do so supports the innocent explanation for the wipe offered by the defendant. 67
IV. CONCLUSION
¶20

Armed with partial or incomplete information regarding digital matters as noted
above, courts unfortunately can reach the wrong conclusion. As illustrated in TR
Investors, LLC v. Genger, where the plaintiff successfully, but mistakenly, asserted the
defendant committed spoliation of evidence and unwittingly led Vice Chancellor Strine
to impose an unreasonable and expensive burden upon this defendant and all future
litigants and companies in the State of Delaware—the burden of preserving unallocated
space on pain of spoliation sanctions. 68

66

Scalera v. Electrograph Sys. Inc., 262 F.R.D. 162, 179 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (declining to issue sanctions
despite party’s negligent failure to preserve ESI).
67
Port Auth. Police Asian Jade Soc’y of N.Y. and N.J. Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 601 F. Supp.
2d 566, 570–71 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying sanctions despite document destruction and finding other
available evidentiary sources available); Bunty, 617 F. Supp. 2d 359, 369–71 (Defendant argued the
government destroyed important and potentially exculpatory evidence. Despite determining data was
altered after the government opened a floppy disk, the court found the defendant failed to demonstrate the
government acted in bad faith or that the alteration prejudiced his case, and denied the motion to dismiss
based on spoliation.); Gippetti v. UPS, Inc., No. C07-00812 RMW(HRL), 2008 WL 3264483, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 6, 2008) (denying spoliation claim finding destruction in accordance with retention policy);
Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Davis, No. H-06-2849, 2006 WL 3837518, at *27–28 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 28,
2006) (The plaintiff asked the court for sanctions based on spoliation of evidence. It argued the defendant
deliberately destroyed evidence when he was under a preservation obligation. The court ruled there was
not enough evidence in the record at that time to demonstrate the defendant destroyed records in bad faith.);
Williams v. Saint-Gobain Corp., No. 00-CV-0502E(SC) 2002 WL 1477618, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. June 28,
2002) (refusing to award sanctions for withholding or destroying emails where no evidence of bad faith).
68
Benton v. Dlorah, Inc., No. 06-CV-2488-KEV-GLR, 2007 WL 2225946, at *3 (D. Kan. Aug. 1, 2007)
(refusing to compel production of personal hard drive); Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., 223
F.R.D. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (refusing to issue sanctions for spoliation of electronic evidence).
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